

Canadian Economic Theory Conference 2026 Program and Timetable

May 8–10, 2026

Vancouver School of Economics,
UBC

Room #533

Iona Building, 6000 Iona Drive,
Vancouver

Program

Session 1: Friday May 8, 9:00-10:30

Hoxha (Stanford)*. Targeted Advertising Platforms: Data Sharing and Customer

Murphy (Upenn)*. Clicks or Comments? The quality-quantity trade-off.

Liang, Lu(UCLA)*. Creative Ownership in the Age of AI

Session 2: Friday 10:50-12:20

Peski (University of Toronto)*, Stewart. Non-distortionary elicitation of beliefs in dynamic problems

Dutta (McGill)*, Masatlioglu, Mu. Binary choice paths and random utility

Curello, Quah (NUS)*, Strulovici. Voting over time and space

Session 3: Friday 14:00-15:30

Zhang, Zhou (Columbia)*. Knowledge-Based Mechanisms

Feng (Columbia)*, Liu. Self-Confirming Mechanisms

Kunimoto (Singapore Management University)*, Saran, Serrano. Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable

Session 4: Friday, 15:50-17:20

Rahman (University of Minnesota)*. Duality and Recursion in Dynamic Games

Gori (Toulouse)*, Khounsari. Indexability in locally correlated search and applications

Xiong (UC Riverside)*. Börgers's Open Question Resolved

Session 5: Saturday May 9, 9:00-10:30

Csóka, Liu, Rodivilov (Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute)*, Teytelboym. Efficiency and Collusion-Proofness in Dynamic Mechanism

Brandl, Shi (University of Toronto)*. Sequential Sampling under Adversarial Manipulation

Fuchs, Gral, Morreira (FGV EPGE Brazilian School of Economics and Finance)*. Repeated Trade with Divisible Goods

Session 6: Saturday 10:50-12:20

Yang (UCL)*, Dai, Wang. The Fragile Promise: Job Security and Contract Design

Fahim, Gervais, Krishna (Florida State)*. Monitoring in Dynamic Financial Contracts

Basak (Indiana)*, Choudhary, Zhou. Frequent Stress Tests

Session 7: Saturday 14:00-15:30

Han(McMaster)*, Xiong. Contracting with Imperfect Commitment

Ozyurt (York University)*, Zeng. Peaceful Dispute Resolution with an Imperfectly Informed

Watson (UCSD)*, Miller. Coalitions and Recurrent Negotiation in Multilateral Relational Contracts

Session 8: Saturday 15:50-17:20

Antic (Northwestern)*, Pei. Selective Disclosure in Overlapping Generations

Orzach (Boston University)*. Self-Censorship of Hard Information

Li (Concordia)*, Yang, Pu. The Design of Quality Disclosure Policy and the Limits

Conference Dinner: Saturday 18:30-

Session 9: Sunday May 10, 9:00-10:30

Han, Sam (University of Calgary)*. Information Design from Endogenous Private Signals

Habermacher (Universidad de los Andes)*, Foerster. Authority, communication, and internal markets

Arieli (University of Toronto)*, Stewart. Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment

Session 10: Sunday, 10:50-12:20

Fabrizi (Berkeley)*. Attention Holdup

Awarya (University of Tokyo)*, Krishna. Social Learning with Correlated Information

Lee (Washington St. Louis)*, Echenique, Goel. Swap Bounded Envy

Conference Timetable

Friday, May 8

Time	Event
9:00–10:30	Session 1
10:30–10:50	Coffee Break
10:50–12:20	Session 2
12:20–14:00	Lunch
14:00–15:30	Session 3
15:30–15:50	Break
15:50–17:20	Session 4

Saturday, May 9

Time	Event
9:00–10:30	Session 5
10:30–10:50	Coffee Break
10:50–12:20	Session 6
12:20–14:00	Lunch
14:00–15:30	Session 7
15:30–15:50	Break
15:50–17:20	Session 8
18:30–	Conference Dinner

Sunday, May 10

Time	Event
9:00–10:30	Session 9
10:30–10:50	Break
10:50–12:20	Session 10