Published Papers:


·        Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices (with Michael Peters), Journal of Economic Theory  75, pp.141_179 (1997)

·        On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 542-564 (2001)

·        Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle (with B. Douglas Bernheim), Journal of Political Economy, vol. 111, no. 4 (2003)

·        Bequests as signals: Implications for fiscal policy, Journal of Public Economics 90 (2006)

·        Internet Auctions with Many Traders (with Michael Peters), Journal of Economic Theory 130, pp. 220-245 (2006)

·        Screening when some agents are nonstrategic: does a monopoly need to exclude? (with Raymond Deneckere), RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 816–841 (2006)

·        Individually Rational, Budget-balanced Mechanisms and Allocation of Surplus (with Grigory Kosenok), Journal of Economic Theory, 140, pp. 126-161 (2008)

Appendix B

·        An Efficient Solution to the Informed Principal Problem, Journal of Economic Theory, 141[1], pp. 114-133 (2008)

·        Mechanism Design with Partial State Verifiability (with Raymond Deneckere), Games and Economic Behavior, pp. 487-513 (2008)

·        The Value of Information and Optimal Organization, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 238-265 (2008)

·        An Ascending Double Auction (with Michael Peters), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 37(2), pp. 281-306 (2008)

·        Investment Tournaments (with Michael Schwarz), Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 28 (4), pp. 893-922 (2010)

·        Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission (with Rosella Argenziano and Francesco Squintani), American Economic Journal-Microeconomics, Vol. 8(3), pp. 119-155 (2016)

·        Disclosure and Legal Advice (with Yeon-Koo Che), American Economic Journal – Micro, accepted (2016)


Working papers:


·       Optimal Mechanism with Budget Constrained Buyers, 2016, (with Alexei Boulatov)

·      Optimal Screening with Costly Misrepresentation, 2014, (with Raymond Deneckere)

·        A Method to Solve a Class of Two-Dimensional Screening Problems (with Raymond Deneckere) – COMING SOON

·        ‘Ex-Post Individually Rational Mechanisms,’ with Joon Song (2008)

·        ‘Can Lower Prices Signal High Quality: A Two-Period Model of Quality Signaling,’ (2005).

·        ‘Influence Activities, Efficiency and Promotion in Organizations,’(2006)

·        ‘Sustaining Cooperation through Delegation" (2005)

·        ‘Methods Of Multidimensional Screening,’ (2008)

·        ‘Sequential Auctions with Budget Constraints,’ with Thomas Jeitschko (2008)


Current Projects:


·        ‘Multidirectional Signaling,’ with B. Douglas Bernheim.

·        ‘Optimal Debate and Trial Structure,’ with Raymond Deneckere

·        ‘Signaling in Multiple Dimensions,’ with Raymond Deneckere

·        ‘Networks, Hubs and Competition in the Airline Industry,’ with Raymond Deneckere.

·        ‘Censorship and Sponsorship,’ with Timofyi Mylovanov

·        ‘Sequential Contracting with Endogenous Timing.’

·        ‘Competition and Network Structure,’  with Esteban Arcaute