Published Papers:

· Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices (with Michael Peters), Journal of Economic Theory 75, pp.141_179 (1997)

· On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 542-564 (2001)

· Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle (with B. Douglas Bernheim), Journal of Political Economy, vol. 111, no. 4 (2003)

· Bequests as signals: Implications for fiscal policy, Journal of Public Economics 90 (2006)

· Internet Auctions with Many Traders (with Michael Peters), Journal of Economic Theory 130, pp. 220-245 (2006)

· Screening when some agents are nonstrategic: does a monopoly need to exclude? (with Raymond Deneckere), RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 816–841 (2006)

· Individually Rational, Budget-balanced Mechanisms and Allocation of Surplus (with Grigory Kosenok), Journal of Economic Theory, 140, pp. 126-161 (2008)

Appendix B

· An Efficient Solution to the Informed Principal Problem, Journal of Economic Theory, 141[1], pp. 114-133 (2008)

· Mechanism Design with Partial State Verifiability (with Raymond Deneckere), Games and Economic Behavior, pp. 487-513 (2008)

· The Value of Information and Optimal Organization, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 238-265 (2008)

· An Ascending Double Auction (with Michael Peters), Economic Theory, Vol 37(2), pp. 281-306 (2008)

· Investment Tournaments (with Michael Schwarz), Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 28 (4), pp. 893-922 (2010)

· Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission (with Rosella Argenziano and Francesco Squintani), American Economic Journal-Microeconomics, Vol. 8(3), pp. 119-155 (2016)

· Disclosure and Legal Advice (with Yeon-Koo Che), American Economic Journal - Microeconomics, Vol. 9(2), pp.188-225 (2016)

· Optimal and Efficient Mechanisms with Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Buyers (with A.Boulatov), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol 127 (May), pp.155-178 (2021)

· Investment and Information Acquisition (with Dimitri Migrow), American Economic Journal - Microeconomics, Vol. 14 (3), pp. 480-529 (2022)

· Screening, Signalling and Costly Misrepresentation (with Raymond Deneckere), Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 55(3), pp. 1334-1370 (2022) Appendix

· Irrigation Intensity, Environmental Conditions and Crop Production in the Rio Grande- Bravo Basin (Mexico) (with Nicolas Sisto), Modernizing Irrigation and Drainage for a new Green Revolution. Transactions of the 23rd Congress of the International Commission on Irrigation and Drainage - Abstract Volume, Question 60 and 61, p.228, Mexico City (2017)

· The potential benefits of reallocating water among agricultural users (with Nicolas Sisto), ANDULI Revista Andaluza de Ciencias Sociales, 22, pp. 165-179 (2022)

· Growing Crops in Arid, Drought-Prone Environments: Adaptation and Mitigation (with Nicolas Sisto and Gilberto Aboites Manrique), Hydrology, 9, 129 (2022)

· Who Wants to be an Auctioneer? (with Gabor Virag), forthcoming at Journal of Economic Theory

Working papers:

· Mechanism Design with Ex-Post Individual Rationality and Budget Balance, with Joon Soon (2018)

· A Solution to a Class of Multi-Dimensional Screening Problems: Isoquants and Clustering, with Raymond Deneckere (2017 version)

· ‘Dating and Divorce’, with Li Hao (2018)

· ‘Screening under Fixed Cost of Misrepresentation’, with Yin Chi (Terry) Tam (2018)

· ‘Influence Activities, Efficiency and Promotion in Organizations,’(2011)

· ‘Sustaining Cooperation through Delegation" (2009)

· ‘Methods Of Multidimensional Screening,’ (2008)

· ‘Sequential Auctions with Budget Constraints,’ with Thomas Jeitschko (2010)

Current Projects:

· ‘Multidirectional Signaling,’ with B. Douglas Bernheim.

· ‘Optimal Debate and Trial Structure,’ with Raymond Deneckere

· ‘Consumer Choice with Ex-Ante and Ex-Post pricing,’ with Emiliano Cantonini

· ‘Networks, Hubs and Competition in the Airline Industry,’ with Raymond Deneckere.

· ‘Censorship and Sponsorship,’ with Timofyi Mylovanov

· ‘Sequential Contracting with Endogenous Timing.’

· ‘Competition and Network Structure,’ with Esteban Arcaute