Published Papers:


        Competition among Sellers Who Offer Auctions Instead of Prices (with Michael Peters), Journal of Economic Theory  75, pp.141_179 (1997)

        On Information Sharing and Incentives in R&D, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 542-564 (2001)

        Bequests as Signals: An Explanation for the Equal Division Puzzle (with B. Douglas Bernheim), Journal of Political Economy, vol. 111, no. 4 (2003)

        Bequests as signals: Implications for fiscal policy, Journal of Public Economics 90 (2006)

        Internet Auctions with Many Traders (with Michael Peters), Journal of Economic Theory 130, pp. 220-245 (2006)

        Screening when some agents are nonstrategic: does a monopoly need to exclude? (with Raymond Deneckere), RAND Journal of Economics Vol. 37, No. 4, pp. 816841 (2006)

        Individually Rational, Budget-balanced Mechanisms and Allocation of Surplus (with Grigory Kosenok), Journal of Economic Theory, 140, pp. 126-161 (2008)

Appendix B

        An Efficient Solution to the Informed Principal Problem, Journal of Economic Theory, 141[1], pp. 114-133 (2008)

        Mechanism Design with Partial State Verifiability (with Raymond Deneckere), Games and Economic Behavior, pp. 487-513 (2008)

        The Value of Information and Optimal Organization, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 238-265 (2008)

        An Ascending Double Auction (with Michael Peters), Journal of Economic Theory, Vol 37(2), pp. 281-306 (2008)

        Investment Tournaments (with Michael Schwarz), Journal of Labor Economics, Vol. 28 (4), pp. 893-922 (2010)

        Strategic Information Acquisition and Transmission (with Rosella Argenziano and Francesco Squintani), American Economic Journal-Microeconomics, Vol. 8(3), pp. 119-155 (2016)

        Disclosure and Legal Advice (with Yeon-Koo Che), American Economic Journal Micro, accepted (2016)


Working papers:


       Optimal Mechanism with Budget Constrained Buyers, 2017

      Optimal Screening with Costly Misrepresentation, 2017, (with Raymond Deneckere)

        A Method to Solve a Class of Two-Dimensional Screening Problems, 2017 (with Raymond Deneckere)

        Ex-Post Individually Rational Mechanisms, with Joon Song (2015)

        Can Lower Prices Signal High Quality: A Two-Period Model of Quality Signaling, (2005).

        Influence Activities, Efficiency and Promotion in Organizations,(2011)

        Sustaining Cooperation through Delegation" (2009)

        Methods Of Multidimensional Screening, (2008)

        Sequential Auctions with Budget Constraints, with Thomas Jeitschko (2010)


Current Projects:


        Multidirectional Signaling, with B. Douglas Bernheim.

        Optimal Debate and Trial Structure, with Raymond Deneckere

        Signaling in Multiple Dimensions, with Raymond Deneckere

        Networks, Hubs and Competition in the Airline Industry, with Raymond Deneckere.

        Censorship and Sponsorship, with Timofyi Mylovanov

        Sequential Contracting with Endogenous Timing.

        Competition and Network Structure,  with Esteban Arcaute